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Abstract: When Google or the U.S. Census Bureau publish detailed statistics on browsing
habits or neighborhood characteristics, some privacy is lost for everybody while supplying
public information. To date, economists have not focused on the privacy loss inherent in data
publication. In their stead, these issues have been advanced almost exclusively by computer sci-
entists who are primarily interested in technical problems associated with protecting privacy.
Economists should join the discussion, first, to determine where to balance privacy protection
against data quality; a social choice problem. Furthermore, economists must ensure new pri-
vacy models preserve the validity of public data for economic research.
Introduction
Privacy protection and scientific output are public goods. When Google displays search content clearly
derivative of your recent online history or when the U.S. Census Bureau publishes geographically detailed
demographic data clearly descriptive of your own neighborhood, some privacy is lost for everybody while
supplying information that can be repeatedly re-used to increase utility.
Economists studying privacy have not focused on decisions about privacy loss inherent in the data publica-
tion process. These issues have recently been advanced almost exclusively by computer scientists who focus
on technologies for increasing information quality while protecting privacy. Abowd and Schmutte (2019)
showed that decisions about protecting privacy and making information public inherent in publishing data
from confidential sources can be addressed using traditional social welfare analysis. This embeds the com-
puter scientists’ contributions into a framework that allows social scientists to contribute to the debate about
safe methods for analyzing and publishing confidential data.
Economists rely heavily on designed data and administrative records from governmental agencies to do
critical research. These studies are often done under the supervision of a statistical agency exercising its dual
mandate to disseminate information and to protect the privacy and confidentiality of respondent data. We
have long recognized that there is tension between these mandates. Cryptographers established in the early
2000s that there is a hard limit to the amount of fully accurate information that can be published from any
finite confidential database (Dinur and Nissim, 2003)—a budget constraint stated in terms of confidential
information leakage. New methods of confidentiality protection, known as formal privacy in computer
science, quickly followed.
The implications of database reconstruction for the work of statistical agencies were largely unexplored
before the U.S. Census Bureau announced its research program (Census Scientific Advisory Commit-
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tee (CSAC) Meeting, September 2016) and its decision to implement differential privacy (Dwork et al.,
2006), the leading variant of formal privacy models, for the 2020 Census of Population (CSAC Meeting,
September 2017). The Commission on Evidence-based Policymaking (2017) also explicitly recommended
that statistical agencies embrace privacy-enhancing data analysis methods.
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Figure 1. : The trade-off between privacy loss and accuracy in data publication
These methods enforce an explicit trade-off between privacy protection and statistical accuracy, which
economists will recognize as a production function. Implementation requires that the analyst acknowledge
that fitting some models privately precludes fitting others unless more privacy-loss is permitted. An explicit
choice—outside the domain of computer science, but integral to economics—must be made: what is the
optimal accuracy-privacy protection point for a given collection of data. The social choice is constrained by
the formal privacy technology introduced by cryptographers. The preference mapping, on the other hand,
must be expressed based on the uses of the published information and the attendant confidentiality risk.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical production function with privacy loss (ε) on the x-axis and the accuracy of the
data release on the y-axis. Accuracy is measured relative to releasing the data with no confidentiality protec-
tions (accuracy = 1). Two different social welfare functions are illustrated. The tangent point labeled “Data
Users” reflects the tendency of economists and other social scientists to favor accuracy over confidentiality
protection. The point labeled “Data Custodians” reflects the tendency of data curators, often computer sci-
entists, to favor privacy protection over accuracy. Social scientists have behaved as if they could always have
maximum accuracy in every published statistic. We must now re-design many of our analysis protocols to
accommodate the constraints of provably effective privacy protection.
Economists are not the only ones. Apple (Differential Privacy Team, 2017), Google (Erlingsson, Pihur and
Korolova, 2014), Microsoft (Ding, Kulkarni and Yekhanin, 2017), and many other information technology
giants face the same conundrum. Because there are both technological and social preference components to
4 JANUARY 2019
the problem, ceding the debate to computer scientists focuses too much attention on the privacy mechanism
and too little attention on how to do good social science under a privacy-loss constraint. By drawing the
attention of economists to their role in studying this problem, this paper begins to redress this imbalance.
I. Scientific Integrity Is the Highest Priority
Scientific discoveries are made by examining data using appropriate statistical techniques. We call those
methods inference-valid when, under the maintained assumptions, the statistical conclusions have the prob-
ability distributions indicated by the theory. Inference-valid analyses allow the findings to generalize beyond
the data from which they were derived. Scientists prefer to use the original, unmodified data as inputs, since
any modifications may compromise the validity of the inference. However, when using the original data
entails the risk of a breach of confidentiality, statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) is usually applied.
The value of SDL should not be measured merely as a function of its ability to protect against privacy
loss, though this is surely important. Its value also lies in its ability to provide data that admit inference-
valid analysis. Traditional SDL methods fail to uphold this principle (Abowd and Schmutte, 2015). But
inference-validity should be fully embodied in a modern SDL system, and formal privacy principles make
this possible.
II. The Roles to be Played by Economists
Amid the sea change in the way confidential data are made available for research, economists have two
roles to play. As data users, we must gain a clearer understanding of what these changes mean for our ability
to conduct valid research. The policy decisions made at statistical agencies have the potential to improve or
further compromise inferential validity on any research question. Economists must be at the table as these
decisions are made.
At a more fundamental level, economists can help guide policy-makers in deciding how to trade data
accuracy off against privacy protection. The database reconstruction theorem implies that the information
in a confidential database is finite. It can be allocated between the competing uses of protecting privacy or
publishing more accurate statistics. This problem is in the economist’s wheelhouse, particularly given that
both uses are public goods.
Abowd and Schmutte (2019) describe this basic public choice problem, highlighting the key open areas
for research. Fundamentally, we need to understand the social value of accessible, accurate data, and the
social value of protecting the underlying confidential micro-data. Social scientists typically behave as if
the social benefits of high-quality widely available data massively exceed the social costs of any associated
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privacy loss. This belief is not based on any rigorous theoretical or empirical evidence that we have found.1
By contrast, cryptographers and other privacy experts tend to behave as if the social costs of privacy loss
dwarf the benefits of data quality. To date, there are some models of the private demand for privacy (Ghosh
and Roth, 2015; Nissim, Orlandi and Smorodinsky, 2012), as well as a growing evidence base for the private
costs of privacy loss (e.g. Acquisti, John and Loewenstein, 2013).
III. Traditional SDL Is Broken
Some resistance to the modernization of privacy protection arises from the mistaken belief that traditional
SDL necessarily produces more reliable or even exact data with trivial re-identification risks (Ruggles,
2018). Newer methods are unfamiliar, while there are decades of research using data produced with tra-
ditional SDL. Researchers must replace general understanding of formal privacy with correctly reasoned
comparisons of feasible alternatives.
It is important to realize that traditional SDL presents significant problems for social scientific research.
Furthermore, the data demands imposed by quasi-experimental research designs exacerbate these flaws. The
secrecy surrounding traditional SDL is a fatal flaw for social science. For example, when publishing micro-
data, statistical agencies commonly swap records. The swap rate, the algorithm used to determine whether
a record is at risk for swapping, and how the swapping is actually implemented, are all kept secret because
there is no formal model to demonstrate that “enough” swapping was done. It might then be possible to
undo the confidentiality protection afforded by the swapping (Abowd and Schmutte, 2015).
Aside from the possible biases that swapping and other methods may introduce, traditional SDL intro-
duces variability into the published data that should affect our inferences about what the underlying confi-
dential data say about the world. This source of variability is almost never explicitly addressed in ensuring
that inferences based on SDL-protected data are valid. Even if we wanted to, because the details of tradi-
tional SDL are kept secret, it is usually not possible to account for it in estimation and inference.
Traditional SDL can also lead to bias in common research designs. Abowd and Schmutte (2015) show
that current SDL practices introduce bias into estimates from linear regression models, instrumental variable
models, and regression discontinuity studies. Analyses based on tabulated data, like the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages (QCEW), are compromised by SDL rules that require cells influenced by just
a few observations to be suppressed. The suppression rules are generally vague, and in most studies, this
suppression is nonignorable. Researchers have become comfortable with the practice of performing the
analysis on the available data using the implicit assumption that suppressed data are missing at random. We
1The literature on the value of public data is remarkably thin, notwithstanding early and important contribution of Spencer (1985), who devel-
oped a framework for modeling optimal data quality, and Panel on Statistics on Natural Gas (1985), who argued against the logical consistency of
standard cost-benefit analysis for public data.
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should aspire to do better. We should aspire to procedures that are provably inference valid.
IV. Formal Privacy Takes, but also Gives
A major concern regarding formal privacy systems is that they will change the ways in which researchers
can access data, particularly micro-data. Exactly how formal privacy systems will affect the publication of
detailed micro-data is the subject of extensive current research. Any change to the way published micro-data
are distorted is a matter of form and degree.
It is natural to mourn the loss of familiar data summaries, particularly as they may cause a break in con-
tinuity of data releases. But formal privacy methods also allow publishing new tabulations with far more
detail than traditionally possible. Using input noise infusion, the Census Bureau publishes the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI), county-industry level data on employment and job flows with demographic
details and minimal suppression (Abowd et al., 2009). In the first official statistical publication using dif-
ferential privacy, the Census Bureau publishes LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (LODES),
complete block-level data on commuting flows (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008). The Post-Secondary Em-
ployment Outcomes (PSEO) pilot release (US Census Bureau, 2018) relies on differential privacy to publish
detailed earnings and employment outcomes for college and university graduates by degree level. Most
recently, a team of Census Bureau and academics published the Opportunity Atlas (Chetty et al., 2018),
which provides inference-valid tract-level summaries of inter-generational mobility by race and gender—an
outcome that is not feasible using traditional SDL.
V. Computer Scientists Are Right about Re-identification
The cryptographers found a fundamental defect in the approach statistical agencies have historically taken
to SDL. The database reconstruction theorem shows that it is always possible to reconstruct part or all of
a confidential database using combinations of statistics published from that database. Therefore, even the
publication of tabular summaries from, say, the decennial census or the American Community Survey is
tantamount to a data security breach that releases all or part of the confidential database. Every variable in the
reconstructed micro-data is a potential identifier, even if the name and exact address cannot be reconstructed.
Putting aside the legal and ethical questions of what constitutes a meaningful breach of privacy, it is fair to
say that if we woke up tomorrow and learned that 50 percent of decennial census records, including detailed
geography, had been exposed, we would find the statistical system under attack whether or not individuals
could be re-identified from those released data.
Differential privacy does not provide absolute protection against the disclosure of sensitive information.
It trades absolute claims for relative ones, acknowledging at its core the impossibility of providing useful
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data summaries and complete privacy protection (Dwork et al., 2006). Formal methods control the global
risk from reconstruction-abetted re-identification attacks using the privacy-loss budget ε . An adversary with
auxiliary information that includes traditional identifiers (e.g., name and address) along with information
that matches variables released via differential privacy, cannot improve the accuracy of any linkage for any
person or any variable by more than a multiplicative factor of e2ε (see the Online Appendix for details).
If a statistical agency wants to provably limit linkage-based re-identification attacks with a public degree
of confidence, then it has no currently feasible choice except to adopt formal methods and stand by the
privacy-loss budget it sets.
Traditional SDL also relies on uncertainty about whether a linkage-based attack produces a reliable re-
identification. But agencies do not discuss the quantification of this risk—they do not release statistics on
putative re-identifications (the number of records in the confidential database that their internal experiments
were able to re-identify) nor on confirmed re-identifications (the number of putative re-identifications that
were correct). If they did, one could discuss whether such a confirmation rate is acceptable. If a particular
confirmation rate for re-identifications is acceptable, then formal methods can insure that the released data
are consistent with a stated level of uncertainty about correct linkage re-identifications. For example, ε = 1.0
guarantees that the improvement in the odds of a successful re-identification never exceeds 7.4 : 1 for any
person in the population when that person’s data are used in the publications versus when they are deleted or
replaced with an arbitrary record. An ε = 0.25 guarantees that the improvement in the odds never exceeds
1.65 : 1, and an ε = 0.1 guarantees that the improvement never exceeds 1.2 : 1. Many more examples of
differential privacy’s provable protection against re-identification can be found in Wood et al. (2018).
VI. Moving Forward
To make progress, we should agree on the principles used to evaluate confidentiality protection mecha-
nisms, whether traditional or formally private. Three components are essential.
First, agree on a replication protocol that confirms the provenance and authenticity of public-use inputs
such as particular public-use data releases. Next, it identifies and confirms the provenance of the computa-
tions applied to those inputs to generate a specific set of outputs. Finally, the replication protocol confirms
applying these computations to the public-use inputs produces the published outputs claimed in a particular
scientific paper.
Second, agree on a validation protocol that confirms the provenance and authenticity of the confidential
inputs used to produce the versions of the public-use inputs in the replication protocol. Next, it certifies the
mapping from the computations applied in the replication protocol to the computations that must be applied
to the confidential inputs to perform the same statistical analysis. Finally, the validation protocol produces
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outputs that are directly comparable to the outputs from the replication protocol.
Third, agree on a comparison protocol. Multiple candidate and historical public-use products may be put
through the replication and validation protocols. The comparison protocol specifies how the validations will
be compared, given that the replications are correct. Only the validations should be compared, because these
establish the properties of the scientific inferences, given the confidential data. There is no point in directly
comparing replications from alternative inputs because such comparisons have no standard for correctness.
Ideally, an independent panel would conduct this process. However, such a panel would have difficulty
vetting the validation protocol because curating the definitive versions of the confidential inputs to particular
public-use products is very resource intensive. The Census Bureau’s synthetic data program for the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) illustrates the commitment associated with maintaining replication
and validation protocols (Benedetto, Stanley and Totty, 2018).
Statistical agencies must commit resources to the research program outlined here. Professional organiza-
tions and curators of research data must be prepared to work with the agencies. Going forward, cooperation
in achieving the objectives outlined in this section would position both the agencies and the research com-
munity to have increased confidence in the privacy protections and the scientific validity of all analyses
based on the agencies’ data.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Suppose a Bayesian adversary wants to learn the record R belonging to individual i, from a confidential
database, x. She has auxiliary information E that includes traditional identifiers (e.g., name and address)
along with other variables that can be used to match against data published via differential privacy. The
adversary has prior µ over the space of possible data vectors D . A data custodian uses a bounded ε-
differentially private mechanism M to publish output M(x) = ω . Bounded differential privacy mechanisms
treat the total number of records in the confidential database as public. Unbounded differential privacy
mechanisms inject noise into the total record count as well. The algorithms under consideration for use with
the 2020 Census are in the class of bounded differential privacy mechanisms. Upon observing ω and E, the
adversary updates her beliefs about R, the record of an individual i, using Bayes law. By the law of total
probability,
µ(R = r|ω,E) = ∑
z∈D
µ(R = r,z|ω,E)
Note that
µ(R = r,z|ω,E) = µ(R = r,ω,E|z)µ(z)
µ(ω,E)
=
µ(R = r,E|z)Pr[M(z) = ω]µ(z)
∑y∈D µ(ω,E|y)µ(y)
=
µ(R = r,E|z)Pr[M(z) = ω]µ(z)
∑y∈D µ(E|y)Pr[M(y) = ω]µ(y)
,
where the second equality follows under the assumption that ω is conditionally independent from R and E
given z. The probability of observing ω given z is completely determined by the coin flips of the mechanism.
Hence,
µ(R = r|ω,E) = ∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z) = ω]
∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y) = ω]
.
Now consider a hypothetical counterfactual where the mechanism M does not use i’s record, and the
adversary knows it. Instead M runs on x˜= x−i∪ r f the data vector in which i’s record is removed from x and
replaced by an arbitrary default record, r f . In this case, the adversary’s updated beliefs are:
µ−i(R = r|ω,E) = ∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z˜) = ω]∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
.
The notation µ−i characterizes beliefs over x˜ derived from µ and knowledge that R has been removed and
replaced by r f . We conclude the following:
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µ(R = r|ω,E)
µ−i(R = r|ω,E) =
∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y) = ω]
∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z˜) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
=
∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z) = ω]/∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z˜) = ω]
∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
≤ ∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)e
εPr[M(z˜) = ω]/∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z˜) = ω]
∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
(M is bounded ε-differentially private so Pr[M(z) = ω]≤ eεPr[M(z˜) = ω].)
=
eε ∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z˜) = ω]/∑z∈D µ(R = r,E,z)Pr[M(z˜) = ω]
∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
(Factor out eε .)
=
eε
∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
(The summations in the numerator ratio cancel out; i.e., the ratio equals 1.)
≤ e
ε
∑y∈D µ(E,y)e−εPr[M(y˜) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
(M is bounded ε-differentially private so Pr[M(y) = ω]≥ e−εPr[M(y˜) = ω].)
=
eε
e−ε ∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]/∑y∈D µ(E,y)Pr[M(y˜) = ω]
(Factor out e−ε)
= e2ε
(The summations in the denominator ratio cancel out; i.e., the ratio equals 1.)
Similarly, µ(R=r|ω,E)µ−i(R=r|ω,E) ≥ e−2ε .
